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Most articles that discuss the economics of security focus on the use of rational choice decision models for evaluating 
investment alternatives.  However, security investment decisions involve risk and several researchers have noted that risk 
related decisions often violate the fundamental principles of rational choice decision models.  Accordingly, we assert that 
problems exist with using these models to explain security investment decisions.  Further, we believe that the development of 
prescriptive models to guide investment decisions requires a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes involved.  To 
test these ideas, we introduce a study that uses prospect theory to analyze security practitioners’ investment decisions.   The 
article includes a discussion of our methodology to electronically assess security practitioners’ preference patterns.  
Additionally, we discuss data collection efforts which are currently in-process and future plans to analyze the collected data.  
Interim analytical results of data received prior to AMCIS 2012 will be presented to conference attendees.     
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INTRODUCTION 
 The need for more research concerning information security investments has been noted in the literature (Computing 
Researcher Association 2006; U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009; Zafar and Clark 2009).  While a hand-full of 
articles addressing the topic have been published, the majority focus on the use of rational choice decision models to evaluate 
investment alternatives (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 2004a; Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan 2004b; 
Cavusoglu, Raghunathan and Yue 2008; Gal-Or and Ghose 2005; Gordon and Loeb 2002; Herath and Herath 2008).  
Rational choice models are premised on the assumptions that decision makers:  1) calculate the value of choice alternatives 
using stated probabilities and outcomes,  2) apply probabilities linearly as decision weights, and  3) choose alternatives that 
yield the highest net value (Crozier and Ranyard 1997).   
While research based on rational choice models provides normative guidance concerning investment options, it is 
important to note two key problems with applying these models to the information security investment context.  First, rational 
choice models theorize that individuals calculate the value of each alternative using known probabilities and outcomes.  
However, the probability of occurrence and financial consequences resulting from security events are rarely known a priori.  
Further, accurate estimation of these values is widely recognized as a highly challenging endeavor for even the most 
experienced practitioner (Computing Researcher Association 2006; U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009).  The 
second problem with applying rational choice models in the security context concerns the postulation that individuals apply 
probabilities linearly as decision weights.  IS security investment decisions are risk related, and several researchers have 
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noted that risk related decisions are often characterized by phenomena which violate the fundamental principles of rational 
choice decision models.  These phenomena include:  1) nonlinear application of probabilities as decision weights, 2) different 
risk attitudes toward gains and losses, and 3) preferences for certain outcomes over merely probabilistic outcomes (Allais 
1953; Crozier and Ranyard 1997; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 1977; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992).   
To explain these pervasive inconsistencies with rational choice models, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed 
prospect theory which they later defined as the “approximate, incomplete, simplified description of the evaluation of risky 
prospects.”  Central to prospect theory is the concept of framing.  Tversky and Kahneman defined framing as the 
manner in which a statement or question is worded, such that the wording influences the “decision maker’s conception of the 
acts, contingencies, and outcomes” of the given options (1981, p. 453).  During the course of their studies, Tversky and 
Kahneman found that individuals exhibit significantly different preference patterns when choosing between options framed 
as gains and options framed as loses.     Prospect theory is considered the most influential of all descriptive decision theories 
(Crozier and Ranyard 1997) and has been used to study risk related decisions in a variety of disciplines (Church, Libby and 
Ping 2008; Devers, McNamara, Wiseman and Arrfelt 2008; Edwards, Miles Jr. and Von Winterfeld 2007; Latham and Braun 
2009; Wagner, Hennig-Thurau and Rudolph 2009).  The notion of using prospect theory to explain users’ information 
security related behavior was suggested by West (2008) but was not empirically tested.  
 The purpose of this study is to determine if prospect theory informs information security investment decisions.  
Specifically, we investigate whether or not the framing of choice options influences security professionals’ investment 
decisions.  The findings of this study will add to our current understanding of the factors that bias security practitioner’s 
perceptions of investment options and lead them to make non-rational decisions.  Prior decision theory research (Edwards et 
al. 2007), has shown that a keen awareness of these factors when applying normative decision models can enhance an 
individual’s ability to make a rational decision.  For academics, this study contributes by providing descriptive, behavioral 
information that helps explain information security investment decisions.  For practitioners, this study contributes by 
acquiring key information needed toward the development of decision aids and decision models. Both areas have received 
little research attention to date.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a review of the literature surrounding 
the topics of IS security investment, decision theory, and prospect theory.  Following the articulation of our research 
hypothesis, we explain our methodology to assess security practitioners’ choice patterns when faced with hypothetical 
security investment decisions.  Following the methodology section we present our data collection plan, proposed data 
analysis method, and concluding remarks.   
LITERATURE REVIEW    
IS Security Investment  
 Interest in IS security research has increased dramatically since the early 1990s (Zafar and Clark 2009).  While the 
majority of the literature produced to date focus on security governance, data integrity, privacy, and threat mitigation issues, a 
few authors have concentrated their efforts on the economic implications of security (Cavusoglu et al. 2004a; Cavusoglu et 
al. 2004b; Cavusoglu et al. 2008; Gal-Or and Ghose 2005; Gordon and Loeb 2002; Herath and Herath 2008; Zafar and Clark 
2009).  Using normative decision theory as a guide, Gordon and Loeb (2002) proposed an economic model to help determine 
the optimal security investment level.  Their proposed model derives the expected utility of security investment options by 
comparing the probabilistic benefits accrued from investments to their associated costs. When testing the model via computer 
simulation, the researchers found that economic justification is only appropriate for investments characterized by moderate 
levels of system vulnerability - security investments in systems with very low or extremely high levels of vulnerability could 
not be justified economically using the model.  Further, they concluded that a firm’s maximum security investment levels 
should never exceed 37% of the expected loss resulting from a security incident.  While this seminal article spurred 
additional research pertaining to security investment decisions, use of the model depends on several parameters that are 
extremely difficult (if not impossible) to accurately calculate and/or estimate.  Additionally, to use the model, a system’s 
level of vulnerability must be subjectively determined as no metrics currently exist to objectively measure this construct.  
Accordingly, these limitations restrict practical application of the model. 
 Cavusoglu et al. (2004a)  noted that increased network interconnectivity has elevated IS security concerns in most 
organizations, not just those that compete in high risk industries. Accordingly, they discuss several key factors that should be 
considered when determining the security investment level for an organization.  The first factor they discuss concerns the 
tendency to greatly underestimate the potential losses resulting from intrusions by focusing solely on the tangible, short-term 
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costs necessary to recover operationally from an incident.  The authors argue that inclusion of long-term and intangible costs 
in such estimates helps prevent under-investment in preventive measures.  The second factor the authors discuss concerns the 
effectiveness of three commonly used strategies for evaluating investment alternatives.  The first such strategy is based on 
practitioners’ fears, uncertainty, and doubts (FUD) relating to security.  The FUD strategy relies on the possibility of negative 
consequences to justify security investment.  FUD has been widely used and loses strength after repeated usage. The second 
strategy is based on the cost of purchasing and deploying security technologies.  This approach seeks to identify the amount 
of security coverage that can be purchased for a given amount of money.  The weakness of this approach is that it does not 
attempt to balance investments and generated benefits.  The third and final decision strategy focuses on computing the 
expected utility of each alternative to identify the options which offer the greatest benefits.  Cavusoglu et al. (2004a) argue 
that this strategy yields the highest quality investment decisions.   
Later in 2004, Cavusoglu et al. (2004b) proposed a game theory based model for evaluating the effectiveness IT 
security architectures.  The authors note that many firms utilize a layered security architecture in which tiers of security 
controls are implemented that are both complementary and redundant.  Accordingly, they argue that a layered decision model 
more accurately reflects the total utility provided by layered security architectures.  Use of the model requires estimation of 
many hacker specific and firm specific parameters.  These parameters include values such as of the fraction of dishonest, 
legitimate users and the expected utility hackers derive from breaking into systems.  Given these estimated values, the 
authors stated that practitioners can use the model to determine the value derived by adding additional controls to their 
existing security architecture.  However, practical application of the model is limited due the sheer quantity and complexity 
of input variables that must be estimated, in addition to the challenge of accurately estimating many of them.   
 In 2008, Cavusoglu et al.  used mathematical modeling to compare game-theoretic and decision-theoretic 
approaches to security investment decisions.  They argue that game-theoretic models yield larger payoffs when modeling the 
dynamic, strategic relationships that exist between firms and hackers.  The researchers tested both models using the same sets 
of input parameters.  Results showed that when the outcomes of the models were compared on the dimensions of investment 
level, vulnerability, and payoff, the game-theoretic model yields the highest payoff when the hacker and firm participate in a 
sequential game with the firm making the first move of the game. While these results add credence to the superiority of 
game-theory as a tool to model security investment decisions, practical implementation of the approach is again limited by 
the model’s complexity and the larger number input parameters that must be accurately estimated with insufficient supporting 
data.   
 Wang et al. (2008) proposed incorporating extreme value analysis with the concept of value-at-risk to estimate daily 
losses due to critical security incidents.  Extreme value analysis is a statistical method used to estimate maximum values in 
common probability distributions.  Value at risk refers to probabilistic estimations of the maximum potential loss that could 
occur in a given situation.  Using snapshots of data from a large financial institution, the authors simulate potential daily 
losses due to extreme security exploits.  The researchers argue that this approach allows firms to appreciate the impact of 
critical IS security failures and choose the investment level that best represents their risk preference.  As with previous 
studies, generalization of their results is limited by issues with estimating and/or calculating input parameters and the 
complexity of the model.  Further, the study does not aid practitioners in quantifying the proportion of potential losses that 
should be spent to protect against such a loss. 
 All of these works add to the normative body of knowledge surrounding identification of an optimal security 
investment level assuming that all cost, benefits, and probabilities have been accurately estimated and a rational decision 
process is followed.  These studies do not, however, add to our understanding of how practitioners currently make security 
investment decisions, nor do they explain those decisions.  Further research is needed to guide quantitative estimation 
processes and to protect against any cognitive processes that could bias against rational behavior.  A great deal of empirical 
evidence exists that demonstrates that humans do not always make rational decisions when faced with risk related decisions 
(Allais 1953; Crozier and Ranyard 1997; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Slovic et al. 1977; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992).  Due to this, we feel that successful implementation of any of the above described methods 
first requires a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes used by practitioners when making security investment 
decisions. 
Decision Theory 
 Decision Theory consists of a broad range of concepts and techniques used to describe and explain human decision 
making behavior.  Within decision theory literature, three unique perspectives of decision related research exist (Edwards et 
al. 2007).  The normative perspective of decision theory focuses on the use of logic and mathematics to determine the optimal 
option among several alternatives.  All normative theories are characterized by basic assumptions concerning behavior in 
Young et al.  Prospect Theory and Information Security Investment Decisions 
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Seattle, Washington, August 9-12, 2012. 4 
choice situations.  The dominant normative model is the expected utility model which views the decision process as 
consisting of two phases.  In the first phase, the decision maker calculates the expected utility that could be realized by each 
decision option.  In the second phase, the decision maker compares the expected utility of each option and selects the option 
that yields the greatest utility.  Normative models are powerful tools for rationally comparing options to identify the superior 
option.   
 Models developed under the descriptive perspective of decision theory focus on the motives, cognitive processes, 
and mental models used by individuals to make decisions rather than on identifying the optimal option (Edwards et al. 2007).  
Descriptive models are thus focused on what humans actually do, rather than what they should do.   Of the descriptive 
models of decision theory, Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory is by far the most influential and utilized (Crozier and 
Ranyard 1997).   
 The last decision theory perspective is the prescriptive approach, which focuses on helping individuals make better 
decisions by using normative models with an awareness of the underlying motives, processes, and mental models that might 
influence their ability to make rational choices (Edwards et al. 2007).  The interrelationship that exists between these three 
perspectives is depicted in Figure 1.   
Decision Theory Perspectives
Descriptive Perspective 
What factors and processes impact how you 
make decisions today
Normative Perspective 
What model and 
information is needed to 
make the optimal 
decision?
Prescriptive Perspective
How to make better decisions 
using normative models with an 
awareness of the issues of using 




Figure 1 – Decision Theory Perspectives 
Adapted from (Edwards et al. 2007)  
Prospect Theory 
Normative decision theories have a long history dating back to the eighteenth century, cumulating with publication 
of the expected utility model in 1947 (Miles Jr. 2007).  Since then, expected utility has been used to analyze decision 
behavior in a variety of disciplines (Church et al. 2008; Devers et al. 2008; Edwards et al. 2007; Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Kumar, Park and Subramaniam 2008; Latham and Braun 2009; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Tversky and Kahneman 
1992; Wagner et al. 2009).  However, French economist Maurice Allais (1953) noted inconsistencies between the choices 
predicted by the expected utility model and the actual choices made by individuals when faced with risk related decisions.  
Additionally, Herbert Simon (1957) observed that rationality in human decision making is bounded, due to limitations in 
time, information or cognitive resource.  In work that provides great insight into why human decision making deviates from 
normative models, Kahneman and Tversky completed a series of studies documenting human behavior when faced with 
hypothetical risk related decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Tversky and Kahneman 
1992). 
In their first study (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), the researchers presented students and faculty at three universities 
with questionnaires containing hypothetical choice problems with clearly stated probabilities.  Results showed that 
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respondents systematically violated the underlying principles of expected utility theory in three key ways.  First, subjects 
tended to prefer certain outcomes to probabilistic outcomes even when the utility of the probabilistic option was greater than 
the utility of the certain outcome.  Second, subjects disregarded components shared by all options and only evaluated the 
non-similar components of options.  Finally, decision makers reversed their preferences when the framing of the decision was 
switched from a positive outcome to a negative outcome and vice-versa.   
 In a follow-up study, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) focused their efforts on understanding the effects of option 
framing on risk related decision preferences.  For that study, participants read a short vignette describing the spread of a 
deadly Asian disease.  Respondents were then presented with two hypothetical programs to combat the disease and asked to 
indicate which of two options they preferred.  One half of the participants were presented with program options that were 
positively framed (i.e. lives saved), while the other half were presented with program options that were negatively framed 
(i.e. lives lost).  An important element of the study was that all option pairs yielded the exact same level of utility when 
evaluated according to the principles of the expected utility models (200 people saved and 400 people die).  Accordingly, if 
respondents evaluated the options in a rational manner, they should not exhibit a preference for any one of the two options.  
Similarly, there should be no significant difference in the response patterns to the positively and negatively framed options.  
Table 1 provides the scenario vignette and the positively and negatively framed option pairs that were used in the study.   
 
Vignette:  Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 
people.  Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume that the exact scientific estimates of 
the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Positively Framed Options: 
Program A:  200 people will be saved. 
Program B:  There is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will 
be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.   
Negatively Framed Options: 
Program C:  400 people will die. 
Program D:  There is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, 
and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.    
Table 1.   Classic Prospect Theory Vignette and Framed Options 
Adapted from Tversky and Khaneman (1981)  
 Results of the study showed that 72% of respondents who were presented with the positively framed options, 
preferred program A over program B, while 78% of respondents who were presented with the negatively framed options, 
preferred program D over program C (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).  Thus, when respondents were faced with two 
positively framed options of equal utility, they preferred the more risk-averse option.  Saving 200 lives was perceived as 
more desirable than the 1/3 probability of saving 600 lives coupled with the 2/3 probability of saving no lives.  However, 
when faced with negatively framed options, respondents exhibited a different risk posture; respondents were risk-seeking, 
preferring the riskier of the two options.  The 1/3 probability that no one die coupled with the 2/3 probability that all 600 
people die was perceived as more desirable than the certainty of 400 people dying.  Based on these results, Tversky and 
Khaneman concluded that decision behavior for risk related choices deviates significantly from expected utility.    
Study Hypotheses  
Based on Khaneman and Tversky’s studies, we question whether framing of information security investment options 
influences, and therefore helps explain practitioner investment decisions.  When proposing security investment options, 
practitioners have the option to discuss the investment in terms of the assets that will be protected with the investment 
(positive, or “gain” frame), or in terms of the assets that will be lost without the investment (negative, or “loss” frame).  
According to expected utility theory, such framing should have no impact on decision makers’ preferences for investment 
options of equal utility.  However, as information security investments are risk related decisions and the probabilities and 
outcome estimates used in such decisions are generally regarded as best-guesses, we believe that practitioners exhibit non-
rational tendencies when making such decisions.  Shropshire et al. (2010) found support for the notion that message framing 
influences security adoption behaviors. Accordingly, we put forth the following two hypotheses: 
H1 When presented with two positively framed information security investment options of equal utility, 
security practitioners will prefer the more certain option.         
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H2 When presented with two negatively framed information security investment options of equal utility, 
security practitioners will prefer the less certain option.   
METHODS 
Instrument 
 To test our hypotheses, we developed an on-line survey instrument to assess practitioners’ preferences pertaining to 
security investment options.  Following the example of Tversky and Khaneman (1981), the instrument displays a short 
vignette, lists two investment options, and then asks respondents to indicate which of the two options they prefer.  The 
vignette was worded to closely match the one used in Tversky and Khaneman’s classic study.  Each respondent is randomly 
presented either the negatively or positively framed investment options.  Further, the order of investment options within each 
of these frames is randomized to eliminate the possibility of ordering bias; the less certain option is presented first for 
approximately one half of the respondents and presented last for the other half of the respondents.  All presented investment 
options are of equal utility.  Table 2 presents the vignette, the positively framed options, and the negatively framed options 
that were included in the on-line survey instrument.   
 
Vignette:  Imagine that your company is allocating financial resources to its information security program.  Without such 
investment your company is expected to experience a $600,000 financial impact (asset loss).   
Note: Your assets include financial resources, intellectual property, organizational reputation, personnel time, and the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of your hardware, software, and data.   
Positively Framed Options: 
Program A:  $200,000 worth of assets will be saved with  
certainty. 
Program B:   There is a one-third probability that $600,000 
worth of assets will be saved, and a two-thirds probability 
that no assets will be saved. 
Negatively Framed Options: 
Program A:  $400,000 work of assets will be lost with 
certainty. 
Program B:  There is a one-third probability that no assets 
will be lost, and a two-thirds probability that $600,000 worth 
of assets will be lost.    
Table 2.   Information Security Investment Vignette and Framed Options 
Sample  
 The target population for the study is individuals who have determined, or influenced the amount budgeted for 
information security at the organizational level.  Such individuals may be at a variety of organizational levels, depending on 
the organization.  We are sending personal invitations to participate to 100+ professional contacts of the study authors.  We 
are also inviting local business leaders who participated in local area business training programs related to information 
security.  Last, we are sending personal invitations to individuals who have shown an interest in the topic in various 
professional organizations, networking venues.  Mass email invites are going out to a local InfraGard chapter 
(http://www.infragard.net) in a large, metropolitan city in the southwest, as well as information security professionals within 
the United States Department of Defense Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC, 
http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac) Subject Matter Expert Program.  A large percentage of InfraGard members and IATAC SMEs 
represent non-government organizations, while a smaller percentage are U.S. government employees. 
  To ensure that all survey respondents are actual members of the target population, the first question that is presented 
following the informed consent release asks respondents, “Have you determined the amount, or influenced the decision, of 
how much money is budgeted for information security at an organizational level?”  Respondents who reply yes to this 
question are prompted to enter the number years of experience they have influencing or determining such decisions and are 
then are presented with the vignette and the framed investment options.  Respondents who reply no to the above question, are 
thanked for their interested in the investigation and then exited from the questionnaire.     
Data Analysis Method 
 Collection of data to test our stated hypothesis is currently underway.  Once a large enough sample of responses has 
been collected, the responses will be analyzed using the Chi Squared Independence Test.  This test is used to assess the 
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degree of association between two categorical variables and is the test statistic that was used by Kahneman and Tversky to 
analyze their data.  The test will show if there is a significant difference in the respondents’ preferences for more or less 
certainty regarding information security investments, due to the framing of the question.   
Closing Remarks 
 The results from this research will show whether information security investment decision makers are rational or 
not, and whether their decisions are influenced by classic prospect theory framing effects.  The academic contribution is 
greater understanding of the investment decision process regarding information security, which will support future modeling 
and decision aid research.  The practical contribution to the lower level IT practitioner is evidence that framing does matter, 
suggesting whether it is worthwhile for budget justifications to be framed positively versus negatively.  The longer-term 
practical contribution is the development of prescriptive models for such decision making.   
Development of normative decision models is an imperative component of efforts to assist practitioners with making 
better information security investment decisions.  However, before normative models can be positioned as prescriptive aids to 
guide decision makers, we must first develop a clear understanding of how information security investment decisions are 
made today.  This includes developing a thorough understanding of the real-world decision heuristics that are employed, 
which may bias decision makers against rational evaluation of investment options.  This study adds to the normative decision 
model line of research by demonstrating the effects of framing on information security investment options.       
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